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RESUMEN 
En este artículo se introduce un nuevo concepto de solidaridad en términos 
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se provee. Los procedimientos que obtenemos son los bien conocidos 
métodos del ganador de Condorcet generalizado, y por tanto proveemos 
una caracterización alternativa de esa clase de funciones de elección social 
basada en nuevas propiedades éticas referidas a la solidaridad. 
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1Abstract
In this paper we introduce a new concept of solidarity in terms of reci-
procity and characterize the set of social choice functions that are reciprocate
(in both a strong and a weak sense), anonymous and eﬃcient in a standard
public good provision model when the agents have single-peaked preferences
on the amount of the good provided. The resulting procedures are the well-
known Generalized Condorcet Winner Solutions, and therefore, we provide
an alternative characterization of that class of social choice functions based
in new ethical properties regarding solidarity.
Keywords: Single-peaked preferences, solidarity, welfare domination un-
der preference replacement
JEL classiﬁcation numbers:D 7 1 .
Resumen
En este art´ iculo se introduce un nuevo concepto de solidaridad en t´ erminos
de reciprocidad y se caracteriza el conjunto de funciones de elecci´ on social
que son rec´ iprocas (en un sentido fuerte y en otro m´ as d´ ebil), an´ onimas
ye ﬁcientes en un modelo est´ andar de provisi´ on de bienes p´ ublicos en el
que los agentes tienen preferencias unimodales sobre la cantidad del bien
que se provee. Los procedimientos que obtenemos son los bien conocidos
m´ etodos del ganador de Condorcet generalizado, y por tanto proveemos una
caracterizaci´ on alternativa de esa clase de funciones de elecci´ on social basada
en nuevas propiedades ´ eticas referidas a la solidaridad.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
A solidarity principle applying to the fair allocation problem was introduced
by Thomson [12] under the name of replacement principle. The idea is the
following: every allocation problem can be described by some parameters or
data, such as the set of agents involved in the decision, the description of their
preferences or the possible amount of resources and their distribution among
the agents. The replacement principle imposes solidarity among agents in
the following sense. If some component of the data changes its value within
the admissible domain, every agent should be aﬀected in the same direction:
either all of them improve their position or all of them lose. It is argued
that fair and acceptable social choice rules should fulﬁll this equal treatment
property when facing exogenously given shocks. The replacement principle
has been widely explored in the literature in diﬀerent contexts. When we
consider the population as the relevant variable parameter, Thomson’s [15],
[16] concept of population monotonicity is the accurate translation of the
replacement principle: every agent should lose when we add new agents to
those initially present, since the growth of the population can be seen as a
restriction of the opportunities available to society. This property was inves-
tigated by Moulin [7] in connection with strategy-proofness and by Thomson
[11], [15], [16] and Ching and Thomson [4] in the context of single-peaked
preferences. If we focus on a change on the amount of available resources,
then, the replacement principle takes the form of the resource monotonicity,
a property analyzed by Thomson [14].
The speciﬁc version of the replacement principle we are going to dis-
cuss here applies when the preferences of some individuals change. It was
ﬁrst deﬁned by Moulin [8] under the name of replacement domination and
later by many authors with the names replacement monotonicity or welfare-
domination under preference-replacement (WDUPR). It requires that if
somebody changes his preferences, and this shifts the social decision aﬀect-
ing the remaining agents, then, these should all move in the same direction:
they should either all gain or all lose after the change. This property has
been analyzed in the two contexts of private and public goods economies in
Thomson [17], [18] and [13] respectively -see Thomson [19] for a comprehen-
sive survey-.
We will consider here the provision of a public good, where there are
a continuum of alternatives described by an interval of the real line. It
has been shown by Thomson [13] that with single-peaked preferences, the
only replacement monotonic and eﬃcient social choice functions are those
functions that choose a ﬁxed given point in the interval if it is Pareto optimal
and choose the nearest eﬃcient point to this one if it is not.
3This class of social choice functions constitutes a subclass of the family
of Generalized Condorcet winner solutions deﬁned by Moulin [6], and we
feel that they are in fact very far from desirable. They are quite trivial
decision rules, weighting excessively an arbitrary status quo, so they are very
insensitive to changes in individual preferences.
This paper starts from this criticism and aims to provide a reasonable
alternative to Thomson’s principle of WDUPR. In order to enlarge the
class of procedures, a new and intuitive concept of solidarity among agents
-we call it reciprocity- is introduced in both a strong and a weak version. The
social choice functions and voting schemes that preserve both reciprocity and
anonymity are fully characterized.
The alternative property proposed here tries to embody part of the sub-
stance of the original idea of WDUPR, but diﬀe r sf r o mt h i si nt h es e n s e
that reciprocity can be considered as a somehow introspective conception of
solidarity. Let us think of the society just before deciding what social choice
function -from now on SCF- is going to be used when choosing the level of
some public good. People is likely to accept a procedure that embodies some
idea of solidarity in the sense that this rule provides some form of protec-
tion for every individual against the possible shifts in choice caused by the
changes of preferences of others.
Thomson’s requirement of WDUPRcan be reinterpreted in this context.
The ex-ante social contract in the SCF guarantees that if any individual
changes his preferences, the new value of the function is such that everybody
moves in the same direction -all of them gain or all of them lose with the
change-.
Our reciprocity condition can be seen as another type of social insurance:
agents are no longer treated equally than the rest of individuals who maintain
their original preferences, but equally than the agent who changed his own
one. The idea is as follows: people may now gain or lose when somebody
changes, but if I lose, I want to be sure that the agent who has caused my
loss would be in the same situation than me if I had changed likewise and
shifted the social decision. He would have been moved by my change in the
same direction than I was moved by him.
By considering such contracts before deciding the optimal rule for society,
people might be ready to accept this weaker and introspective concept of
solidarity. Moreover, its philosophy is very intuitive and can be heard in the
real world -people usually are much more permissive with the impositions
of others when they dislike them if they know that they would be treated
equally under similar situations-. The proposed property -in its weak version-
allow for a larger and more ﬂexible class of functions than those allowed
by Thomson’s WDUPR, although Thomson’s class of eﬃcient, replacement
4monotonic SCFs satisﬁes reciprocity.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We ﬁrst introduce the model
in Section 2.I nSection 3, the reciprocity properties are proposed and results
are ﬁnally presented. It is shown that Thomson’s class is a narrow subset of
our class. We close with some comments and conclusions.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a society deﬁned by a set of agents or individuals: N = {1,...,n},
indexed by i and sometimes by j,h and l. Society must make decisions from
some predetermined set of mutually exclusive alternatives, represented by
A, whose elements will be denoted by x,y,... ∈ A. The set of alternatives
will sometimes be ﬁnite -representing discrete levels of the provision of some
public good- and sometimes a closed interval of the real line, normalized for
simplicity to the interval [0,M] and standing for the continuous amount of
the public good or the location of some public utility.
Every individual i ∈ N i se n d o w e dw i t hac o m p l e t epreference relation
over the set of alternatives denoted as Ri from some set of possible preferences
<. We denote by Pi and Ii the asymmetric and symmetric part of Ri. The
set of all possible strict orderings on the ﬁnite set of alternatives A is denoted
by ℘.
When we consider the set of alternatives [0,M], we also assume that the
preference relations are single-peaked. A preference relation Ri on [0,M]i s
single-peaked if and only if there exits a unique number p(Ri) ∈ [0,M]s u c h
that ∀x,y ∈ [0,M], if y<x≤ p(Ri)o rp(Ri) ≤ x<y ,then, xPiy. The
number p(Ri)i st h epeak of agent i0s preference relation and is the most
preferred alternative of agent i ∈ N.
We also assume for simplicity that single-peaked preferences are contin-
uous. We say that preferences Ri ∈ < are continuous if and only if for
every alternative, both the upper and the lower contour sets are closed, i.e.,
∀x ∈ [0,M]=A, {y ∈ A | yRix} and {y ∈ A | xRiy} are closed. This is a
natural assumption when dealing with inﬁnite sets and it is suﬃcient to guar-
antee that for every closed interval contained in [0,M], there exists a most-
preferred alternative. Let <SP be set of all continuous and single-peaked
preference relations on A =[ 0 ,M].
An ordered list of preference relations for all the individuals is called a
preference proﬁle and denoted by R =( Ri)i∈N =( R1,...,R n). We often
use the following notation: given a ﬁxed preference proﬁle R =( R1,...,Rn),
(R0,R−i)i st h ep r o ﬁle in which individual i takes preferences R0 and any
other agent j 6= i remains with the same preferences he had in proﬁle R,
5i.e., Rj. (R0,R 00,R−i−j) is the proﬁle such that the preference relations of
agents i and j in proﬁle R, have been replaced by preference relations R0 and
R00 respectively and the other agents’ preferences are the same than those
t h e yh a di np r o ﬁle R. Then, whatever preference relation is placed in the
ﬁrst component of some partitioned proﬁle (.,.,R−i−j) stands for the pref-
erence relation of agent i in that proﬁle. Hence, the proﬁle (R0,R 00,R−j−i)
is intended to be the proﬁle R when agent j has preferences R0 and agent
i is endowed with preferences R00. Moreover, our particular notation admits
that some agent’s new preference relation is the same preference relation of
that of some other agent in the original proﬁle R, in which case we are al-
lowed to refer to that preference relation with its former subscript in order to
avoid notation; but notice that the subscript accompanying some individual
preference relation in our partitioned notation is not related with the agent
owning that preference relation in the actual proﬁle, but with the agent that
h a di ti nt h eo r i g i n a l- o rreference-p r o ﬁle. Let us illustrate this important
point with an example: The proﬁle (Rj,R 0,R−i−j) should be read in the
following way: ”individual i has the same preference relation that individual
j had in proﬁle R (Rj), agent j possesses the preference relation R0 and the
remaining agents are endowed with the same preference relations they had
in the reference proﬁle R”.
When preferences are single-peaked, the associated vector of peaks will
be: p(R)=( p(Ri))i∈N ∈ [0,M]
n .
Now, we model social objectives. A social choice function (SCF) is a
function which associates a chosen alternative to every preference proﬁle and
will be denoted by f : <n −→ A.
When we work with the set of alternatives [0,M] and single-peaked pref-
erences, we will be interested in a special kind of SCFs called voting schemes.
Voting schemes only use information about the agents’ peaks, so we can de-






Now we deﬁne the properties we shall deal with:
Deﬁnition 1 For each given R ∈ <n,xis an eﬃcient alternative if
x ∈ A and there is no x0 ∈ A with x0Rix ∀i ∈ N and x0Pix for some i ∈ N.
The set of eﬃcient alternatives associated to proﬁle R will be denoted by
x ∈ P(R)
AS C Ff is eﬃcient if and only if it selects eﬃcient alternatives for each
preference proﬁle, i.e., ∀R ∈ <n,f (R) ∈ P(R).
6I nt h ec a s eo fRi single- peaked for all i ∈ N and A =[ 0 ,M], it is easy
to prove that f is eﬃcient whenever ∀R ∈ <n,
f(R) ∈ P(R) = [min{p(Ri) | i ∈ N}, max{p(Ri) | i ∈ N}].
Deﬁnition 2 AS C Ff is manipulable by agent i ∈ N at proﬁle R ∈ <n
via R0
i ∈ <n i fa n do n l yi ff(R0,R−i)Pif(R). Whenever a SCF is manipulable
by some agent at some proﬁle via a preference relation we say that the SCF
is manipulable.
Deﬁnition 3 AS C Ff is strategy-proof if and only if it is not manipula-
ble.
This property constitutes a strong incentive compatibility requirement,
meaning that agents’ lies about their true preferences cannot be in any case
proﬁtable -whatever the declared preferences of others may be-. Strategy-
proofness may therefore be interpreted as requiring that revealing actual
preferences be a dominant strategy for all agents if the SCF is used to choose
alternatives based on the agents’ reported preferences.
Deﬁnition 4 AS C Ff is anonymous if any permutation of the diﬀerent
values of its arguments yields the same alternative -, i.e., for all one-to-one
mappings σ : N → N and all R ∈ <n,f (R1,...,Rn)=f(Rσ(1),...,Rσ(n)).
This property guarantees that no information about the individuals’ names
is used in the decision rule.
Deﬁnition 5 AS C Ff satisﬁes the property of Welfare-domination un-
der preference-replacement (WDUPR)1 if ∀i ∈ N, ∀R ∈ <n, ∀R0 ∈
<, either f(R)Rjf(R0,R−i) ∀j ∈ N\{i} or f(R0,R−i)Rjf(R) ∀j ∈ N\{i} .
The change in the preferences of any individual makes that all the re-
maining agents move in the same welfare direction: either all of them gain
or all of them lose -in the weak sense-.
We now introduce two versions of the main condition in this paper. The
motivation for both versions is the same and they only diﬀer in what they
require when agents are left indiﬀerent when facing somebody’s change in
preferences. Although both versions are quite similar, the possibilities of
ﬁnding social choice functions are very diﬀerent when we require each version
to hold, so the apparently slight diﬀerence is proved to be crucial in allowing
for positive results.
1This property has also been called ”Replacement monotonicity” and ”Replacement
domination”.
7Deﬁnition 6 AS C Ff satisﬁes the property of strong reciprocity if
∀i ∈ N, ∀R ∈ <n, ∀R0 ∈ <, ∀j ∈ N\{i},f (R0,R−i)Rjf(R) ⇒
f(R0,R−j)Rif(R) and f(R)Rjf(R0,R−i) ⇒ f(R)Rif(R0,R−j).
When agent i changes his preferences from Ri to R0 and does not aﬀect
negatively to individual j, we require that if j were the one who changed
his preferences from the initial proﬁl et ot h es a m ea g e n ti0s new preferences
-from Rj to R0-, and individual i w o u l dr e m a i nu n c h a n g e d- w i t hRi-, i would
not lose with j0s change either -so f(R0,R−j)Rif(R) holds-. Symmetrically,
if such a change by individual i makes agent j be worse oﬀ -interchanging the
roles of Ri and R0 above-, the reasoning is the same, but individual i with
initial preferences R0 should now weakly lose -so that f(R0,R−j)Rif(R)h o l d s
in this case too-.
Deﬁnition 7 AS C Ff satisﬁes the property of weak reciprocity if
∀i ∈ N, ∀R ∈ <n, ∀R0 ∈ <, ∀j ∈ N\{i},f (R0,R−i)Rjf(R) ⇒
f(R0,R−j)Rif(R).
In words, if agent i does not make me be (strictly) worse oﬀ by changing
his preference to R0, I should not be able to (strictly) damage him if I would be
the agent who changes to R0 and i will remain unchanged. Weak reciprocity
imposes a ban on perverse asymmetric feelings.
Notice that weak reciprocity implies the following statements: if some-
body makes me gain, I can either improve or not aﬀect at all his position (a).
If the changing agent is damaging me, again I can either cause him a loss
or leaving him unaﬀected (b). Finally, if I am indiﬀerent with i0s change -he
has not made me be (strictly) worse oﬀ-, the deﬁnition applies and I should
not damage him: in my (reciprocate) turn, I should be able either to make
him gain or break even (c).
(a).f (R0,R−i)Pjf(R) ⇒ f(R0,R−j)Rif(R).
(b).f (R)Pjf(R0,R−i) ⇒ f(R)Rif(R0,R−j).
(c).f (R0,R−i)Ijf(R) ⇒ f(R0,R−j)Rif(R)&
f(R0,R i,R−i−j)R0f(R0,R−i).
Weak reciprocity relaxes strong reciprocity in just one sense. We must
take a short detour in order to explain the diﬀerence. It is not diﬃcult to
check that strong reciprocity implies the following: ∀i ∈ N, ∀R ∈ <n, ∀R0 ∈







I no r d e rt op r o v et h i s ,j u s tn o t et h a tt h ei n d i ﬀerence on the left hand side
in the former statement is: f(R0,R−i)Rjf(R)a n d f(R)Rj f(R0,R−i);
8by applying strong reciprocity to both expression, we get: ∀i ∈ N, ∀R ∈
<n, ∀R0 ∈ <, ∀j ∈ N\{i},
f(R0,R−i)Rjf(R) ⇒
⇒ f(R0,R−j)Rif(R)( 1 )& f(R0,R−i)R0f(R0,R i,R−i−j)( 2 ) .
f(R)Rj f(R0,R−i) ⇒
⇒ f(R0,R i,R−i−j)R0f(R0,R−i)( 3 )& f(R)Rif(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)( 4 ) .
And since f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R−j)b yd e ﬁnition, (1) and (4) imply
f(R0,R−j)Iif(R)
and (2) and (3) imply f(R0,R−i)I0f(R0,R i,R−i−j), which means that
whenever a change from some i leaves an agent j indiﬀerent -for instance,
when i0s change cannot shift the initial social choice-, the same change from j
should not aﬀect i0s preferences. This is a stronger requirement than desired,
since there might be no reasons for forbidding i to strictly gain, while there
may be reasons for i to lose when j change -the reciprocate symmetry might
forbid ”perverse” hypothetical eﬀects, but there does not seem to be a strong
reason to maintain such a strong implication . Weak reciprocity eliminates
this requirement by allowing unaﬀected agents to improve i0s position, while
not letting him become worse oﬀ.2
Notice that strong reciprocity always implies weak reciprocity but the
converse is not true -(2) and (4) cannot be derived from weak reciprocity-.
Deﬁnition 8 AS C Ff is dictatorial if and only if ∃i ∈ N such that
∀Ri ∈ <, ∀R−i ∈ <−i,f (Ri,R−i) ∈ {a ∈ A | aRib ∀b ∈ A}.
Dictatorial SCFs always select a given individual’s ﬁrst choice regardless
of the preferences of the others. We will need this class of undesirable SCFs
in some proofs.
Deﬁnition 9 AS C Ff is constant i fa n do n l yi f∃a ∈ A such that
∀R ∈ <n,f (R)=a.
Deﬁnition 10 AS C Ff is a Generalized Condorcet winner solution
(GCWS(n +1 ) )if ∃α =( α1,α2,...,αn+1) ∈ [0,M]
n+1 , called phantom
voters or ﬁxed ballots, such that
f(R)=m(p(R1),p(R2),...,p(Rn),α1,α2,...,αn+1).
where m stands for the median. Notice that GCWS(n+1) are voting schemes.
2There is still other possibility of deﬁning an even weaker concept of reciprocity, con-
sisting on not imposing any constraint at all on the behavior of the rule in indiﬀerence
situations -and allowing for the ”perverse” eﬀect in indiﬀerence situations-. The author
have explored this possibility but characterizations become much more complicated, al-
though our intuition is that the results obtained with our version would not change very
much.
9Moulin (1980) showed that when preferences are single-peaked on the
interval [0,M], the only anonymous and strategy-proof voting schemes on
[0,M] are those belonging to the family of GCWS(n +1 ) . If eﬃciency is
additionally imposed, the resulting class is also the median, but with only
n − 1 phantom voters. We will refer to this family as GCWS(n − 1).3






ai f a ∈ P(R)
min{p(Ri) | i ∈ N} if a < min{p(Ri) | i ∈ N}
max{p(Ri) | i ∈ N} if a > max{p(Ri) | i ∈ N}
Denote by Φ the family of adjusted-constant SCFs f, namely
Φ = {fa | a ∈ [0,M] and fa is adjusted-constant to a}.
Thomson [13] proved that class Φ ⊂ GCWS(n − 1) contains the only
eﬃcient SCFs such that WDUPRholds when preferences are single-peaked
on [0,M]. Notice that all the SCFs within class Φ are anonymous, but not
trivial and it is a subclass of the family GCWS(n − 1 )w h e r ew eh a v et h e
n − 1 phantom voters allocated to the same point.
3R e s u l t s
We will study the behavior of the reciprocity property under two diﬀerent
domain assumptions. First, we characterize the anonymous and strong recip-
rocate SCFs in the unrestricted domain of every preference relation when the
set of alternatives is ﬁnite and we will obtain a result that establishes a close
relationship between strategy-proofness and both reciprocity and anonymity.
We will beneﬁt from this property to prove the characterization result by
means of the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. The negative re-
sult shows the impossibility of ﬁnding strong reciprocate and anonymous
SCFs in this domain.
Secondly, we investigate the existence of anonymous, and strong/weak re-
ciprocate SCFs in contexts where preferences are restricted to satisfy single-
peakedness on the closed interval of the real line. We can use some theorems
related with strategy-proof SCFs with single-peaked preferences: Moulin’s
[6] characterization of strategy-proof voting schemes and the extensions of
this result to general SCFs: Barber` a & Jackson [3], Barber` a, Sonnenschein &
3T h em e d i a nf o rt h ec a s eo fn + 1 phantom voters is deﬁned as:
m(p(R1),p(R2),...,p(Rn),α1,α2,...,αn+1) ⇔
#{i | p(Ri) ≤ m} +#{i | αi ≤ m} ≥ n and
#{i | p(Ri) ≥ m} +#{i | αi ≥ m} ≥ n.
10Zhou [2], that will allow us to use the relation between strategy-proofness and
reciprocity. The characterization theorems in this case results in an impossi-
bility for anonymous, eﬃcient and strong reciprocate SCFs and the GCWS
voting schemes are shown to be the only anonymous, eﬃcient and weak recip-
rocate SCFs. Before establishing the main results in this section, we need to
prove two useful lemmata. Lemma 1, is interesting on its own, since it shows
that for any domain of preferences, weak reciprocity and anonymity together
imply that if someone’s change makes me strictly gain, I cannot make him
be strictly better in my turn, but if someone strictly worsens my position, I
can be sure that I would make him lose if I were the one who changed. The
second lemma, Lemma 2, has not an easy interpretation and is intended to
simplify some proofs.
Lemma 1 Assume f is a weak reciprocate and anonymous SCF. Then, ∀i ∈
N, ∀R ∈ <n, ∀R0 ∈ <, ∀j ∈ N\{i},
f(R0,R−i)Pjf(R) ⇒ f(R0,R−j)Iif(R)& f(R0,R−i)P0f(R0,R i,R−i−j).
Proof. Take any i ∈ N, R ∈ <n,R 0 ∈ < and j ∈ N\{i}, and suppose
that f(R0,R−i)Pjf(R)( 1 ) . Since f is weak reciprocate, consider ﬁrst the
proﬁle R =( Ri,R j,R−i−j) and suppose that individual i changes his prefer-
ences from Ri to R0, reaching the proﬁle (R0,R j,R−i−j). By (1), individual j
strictly gains with i0s change, so by weak reciprocity, if it was individual j who
was suﬀering the same change instead of i, the latter individual would not
lose, so it holds that f(R0,R−j)Rif(R) (2). Now, consider that the initial
proﬁle is (R0,R−i)a n da g e n ti changes his preferences to Ri - the converse of
the former shift -. By condition (1), individual j worsens his position, so by
weak reciprocity, if j were the agent who changed to preference Ri -a b s t r a c t -
ing from the subscript - and i would remain unchanged, he would be weakly
worsened likewise, so it also holds that f(R0,R−i)R0f(R0,R i,R−i−j)( 3 ) . We
know till now that (2) and (3) hold, but there may be two possibilities in
each of those conditions: Each can be satisﬁed with strict preference or with
indiﬀerence. We denote every possibility as: (2P),(2I),(3P)a n d( 3 I), i.e.,
f(R0,R−j)Pif(R)( 2 P) f(R0,R−i)P0f(R0,R i,R−i−j)( 3 P)
f(R0,R−j)Iif(R)( 2 I) f(R0,R−i)I0f(R0,R i,R−i−j)( 3 I)
Now, we check all the combined possibilities:
1-( 2 P)a n d( 3 P):
L e tu sc o n s i d e r( 2 P) and focus on the proﬁle (R0,R−j)=( Ri,R 0,R−i−j).
Now, imagine that individual j with preferences R0 changes to preferences Rj,
so that the ﬁnal proﬁle will be (Ri,R j,R−i−j)=R. S i n c ew ea r ea s s u m i n g
that (2P) holds, agent i would be worse oﬀ,s ob yw e a kr e c i p r o c i t y ,i fi would
11had changed from preferences Ri in proﬁle (Ri,R 0,R−i−j)t oRj,iremaining
unchanged, he could not improve agent i0s situation. Hence,
f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)R0f(Rj,R 0,R−i−j)( 4 ) . Now, by anonymity, agents’ names
do not matter, so, we have: f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R i,R−i−j)a n d
f(Rj,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R−i), and we can write (4) as:
f(R0,R i,R−i−j)R0f(R0,R−i). Notice that this last expression directly con-
tradicts (3P), so the present possibility cannot appear.
2-( 2 P)a n d( 3 I):
Let us focus on (3I) and proﬁle (R0,R−i)=( R0,R j,R−i−j) : Suppose
that individual j changes his preferences to Ri -agent i0s preferences in pro-
ﬁle R- so that the ﬁnal situation is (R0,R i,R−i−j). (3I) implies, then, that
individual i with preferences R0 is indiﬀerent about the shift, so by weak
reciprocity, if he were the one who changed to preferences Ri, he could not
have worsened individual j0s position with preferences Rj, which can be writ-
ten as: f(Ri,R j,R−i−j)=f(R)Rjf(R0,R−i)=f(R0,R j,R−i−j)( 5 ) . Notice
that this statement contradicts directly the assumption (1), so this case is
impossible.
3-( 2 I)a n d( 3 I):
This case cannot occur either, since it is identical to case 2 in the sense
that only (3I), when present, causes the contradiction with (1) whether the
case is (2P)o r( 2 I).
4-( 2 I)a n d( 3 P):
This turns out to be the only possibility allowed by both weak reciprocity
and anonymity, so the lemma is proved.
Lemma 2 Assume f is a strong reciprocate and anonymous SCF. Then,
∀i ∈ N, ∀R ∈ <n, ∀R0 ∈ < such that f(R0,R−i) 6= f(R) ⇒
f(R0,R−i)I0f(R0,R−j) ∀j ∈ N\{i}.
Proof. Suppose any i ∈ N, R ∈ <n,R 0 ∈ < such that f(R0,R−i) 6=
f(R). Then, let us take some individual other than the one who shifted
the decision (i), for example, agent j and ﬁnd out in what direction he
was aﬀected by ith’s shift from Ri to R0. there are two possibilities: either
f(R0,R−i)Rjf(R)o r f(R)Rjf(R0,R−i). We will distinguish both cases:
Case 1: f(R0,R−i)Rjf(R)( 1 ) . Consider now the change of agent i
from preferences Ri to R0 : by assumption, j does not loose. We can use
strong reciprocity with respect to agent i and obtain: f(R0,R−j)Rif(R)( 2 ) .
Consider now the proﬁle (R0,R−j) and suppose that agent j with prefer-
ences R0 changes to his original one (Rj). We come back to the proﬁle
12R. By expression (2), agent i weakly looses, and by strong reciprocity
f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)R0f(RjR0,R−i−j)( 3 ) .B u t ,b ya n o n y m i t y ,a n yp e r m u t a t i o n
of the arguments of the SCF cannot modify its value, and the following will
hold: f(R0,R j,R−i−j)=f(Rj,R 0,R−i−j). We can, then, rewrite expression
(3) in this way:
f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)R0f(R0,R j,R−i−j)( 3 0).
Let us focus now on proﬁle (R0,R j,R−i−j) and imagine that agent i
changes preferences R0 to Ri -the converse of the initial change-. By as-
sumption (1), j should be in a worse position, so by strong reciprocity, indi-
vidual i should move in the same direction if j were the one who changed. In
other words, the following holds true: f(R0,R j,R−i−j)R0f(R0,R i,R−i−j)( 4 ) .
Again by anonymity, permuting preferences of agents yields the same social
choice, and this holds: f(R0,R i,R−i−j)=f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j). Expression (4)
can be expressed this way: f(R0,R j,R−i−j)R0f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)( 4 0). State-
ments (30)a n d( 4 0) are obtained from the assumptions, and both should
be simultaneously true, so in this case we conclude: f(R0,R j,R−i−j)=
f(R0,R−i)R0f(R0,R−j)=f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j).
Case 2: f(R)Rjf(R0,R−i). We can follow the same steps as in case
1. The only diﬀerence is that every preference relation is inverted, and we
obviously reach the same conclusion as in case 1.
Corollary 1 Let A be a ﬁnite set of alternatives and < = ℘.I fS C F f is
strong reciprocate and anonymous, then, f is strategy-proof.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction: we suppose that f is not strategy-
proof but it is both strong reciprocate and anonymous, and we will ﬁnd a
contradiction. If f is not strategy-proof, then, there exist: ∃i ∈ N, ∃R ∈
<n, ∃R0 ∈ <, such that f(R0,R−i)Pif(R). This obviously implies that
f(R0,R−i) 6= f(R), so we can directly apply Lemma 2 and obtain
f(R0,R−i)I0f(R0,R−j) ∀j ∈ N\{i} (1). Since we are working with
strict orderings, it implies that
f(R0,R−i)=f(R0,R−j) ∀j ∈ N\{i}. Consider now the change of in-
dividual j with preferences Ri in proﬁle (R0,R−j)=( R0,R i,R−i−j)t oh i s
original preferences Rj ,r e a c h i n gp r o ﬁle (R0,R j,R−i−j). From (1), individual
i with preferences R0 remains indiﬀerent with the change, so by strong reci-
procity and anonymity, we get f(R0,R−i)=f(R), contradicting our initial
assumption.
Corollary 2 Let A be a ﬁnite set of alternatives and < = ℘. There do not
exist anonymous and strong reciprocate SCFs such that #(range(f)) ≥ 3.
13The proof is obvious by using Corollary 1 and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem -Gibbard [5], Satterthwaite [9]-.
The former negative result leads us either to consider more restricted
domains of preferences or to focus on weak reciprocity. If we relax the reci-
procity condition to its weaker version, we can see that there exist eﬃcient,
anonymous and weak reciprocate SCFs, even for quite rich domains, like the
one of strict orderings over alternatives. Let us consider n =3 ,A= {a,b,c}






ai fa ∈ P(R)
bi fa / ∈ P(R)&D(b,c,R) >D (c,b,R)
ci fa / ∈ P(R)&D(b,c,R) <D (c,b,R)
where D(x,y,R)=#{i ∈ Ns . t .x R iy} ∀x,y ∈ A, x 6= y, ∀R ∈ <3. It is
not diﬃcult to prove that this SCF and its analogous are eﬃcient, anony-
mous, weak reciprocate and satisfy WDUPR. Unfortunately, they weight
excessively an arbitrary status quo, they are not strategy-proof and it is not
clear how they can be generalized to more than three alternatives or to do-
mains admitting indiﬀerence sets. Therefore, We will now consider other
domains. In order to compare both versions of reciprocity with WDUPR,
we focus on the restricted domain of continuous, single-peaked preference
relations on A =[ 0 ,M]. From now on, we should distinguish between both
kinds of reciprocity, which will be separately explored. We start with our
main results concerning strong reciprocity.
Theorem 1 Let < = <SP and n =2 . Then, there do not exist eﬃcient,
strong reciprocate and anonymous SCFs.
Proof. L e tu sc o n s i d e ra n yp r o ﬁle R =( R1,R 2) such that P(R1)=0
and P(R2)=M (see Figure 1). Suppose w.l.g. that f(R1,R 2) ∈ [0,M)
-otherwise, just permute the names of the agents and the reasoning will be
analogous-. Now, consider any proﬁle b R1 such that P(b R1) ∈ (f(R1,R 2),M]
a n ds u c ht h a t∀x ≥ P(b R1),x b R1y ∀y<P (b R1). -Notice that there always
exist admissible single-peaked preferences for which that condition holds-.
Now, suppose that individual 1 in proﬁle R changes his initial preferences
R1 to preferences b R1, such that the new proﬁle will be (b R1,R 2). Since there





so f(b R1,R 2) >f (R1,R 2) and single-peaked preferences makes agent 2 in
proﬁle R with preferences R2 be strictly better oﬀ with i0s change, since
14f(b R1,R 2)P2 f(R1,R 2), so by strong reciprocity, if agent 2 were the one who
changed to preferences b R1 = b R2 while agent 1 would remain unchanged
with R1, f(R1, b R2)R1 f(R1,R 2). Hence, since P(R1)=0 , it must be that
f(R1, b R2) ≤ f(R1,R 2).
N o w ,l e tu sc o n s i d e rp r o ﬁle (R1, b R2) and suppose that agent 2 with prefer-
ences b R2 changes to new preferences b b R2 = R2, the new proﬁle being (R1,R 2).
s i n c ew ek n o wf r o ma b o v et h a tf(R1, b R2) ≤ f(R1,R 2)=f(R1, b b R2), individ-
ual 1 with preferences R1 can either be indiﬀerent with the change whenever
f(R1, b R2)=f(R1,R 2) or strictly loose if the case is that of f(R1, b R2) <
f(R1, b b R2)=f(R1,R 2). Suppose ﬁrst that f(R1, b R2) <f (R1,R 2) : this im-
plies that 1 loses with the change, and strong reciprocity requires that, if
he were the one who changed from R1 to b b R1 = b b R2 = R2, agent 2 with
initial preferences b R2 in proﬁle (R1, b R2) could never gain with the change.
Therefore,
f(R1, b R2)b R2f(b b R1, b R2)=f(R2, b R2). (1)
Since, by anonymity, f(R2, b R2)=f(b R2,R 2)=f(b R1,R 2), expression (1) can














, so since b R2 = b R1 and
f(R1, b R2) ≤ f(R1,R 2) <P (b R1) ≤ P(R2)=M, f(b R1,R 2)b P1f(b R1,R 2), a
contradiction.
It remains to check the case in which f(R1, b R2)=f(R1,R 2)a n da g e n t1
is indiﬀerent with 20s change from b R2 to b b R2 = R2. By strong reciprocity, 1
should leave agent 2 indiﬀe r e n ti fh ew e r et h eo n ew h oc h a n g e dp r e f e r e n c e s ,
so again by anonymity, it should hold that f(b R1,R 2)=f(R1, b R2) <P(b R1) ≤
P(R2), contradicting eﬃciency of f at f(b b R1, b R2)=f(R2, b R2)=f(b R1,R 2).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Theorem 2 Let < = <SP and n ≥ 3.T h e n ,t h eo n l ys t r o n gr e c i p r o c a t ea n d
anonymous SCFs are constant.
Proof. We have to prove both implications:
Step 1:( ⇒) < single-peaked, f is a strong reciprocate and anonymous
SCF with #N ≥ 3 ⇒ f is constant.
15We will ﬁrst demonstrate that under the single-peakedness assumption
and #N ≥ 3, every strong reciprocate and anonymous SCF has to be
strategy- proof. It will be proved by contradiction: we ﬁrst suppose that
f is anonymous, manipulable and strong reciprocate and we will ﬁnd a con-
tradiction.
Let us consider only three ordered individuals to simplify the notation of
the proof, and let us call them 1, 2 and 3. The proﬁle that is supposed to be
manipulated will be now the following: (R1,R 2,R 3)a n dl e ta g e n t1- w i t h o u t
loss of generality- be the manipulator, changing to preferences R0.
We can now apply Lemma 2 for j =2 ,3 with the above change, so the
following statements are true: f(R1,R 0,R 3)I0f(R0,R 2,R 3) (1) and
f(R1,R 2,R 0)I0f(R0,R 2,R 3)( 1 0).
Consider now the change consisting of changing agent 1’s preferences
from R1 to R3 in the proﬁle (R1,R 2,R 0), the ﬁnal preference proﬁle being:
(R3,R 2,R 0). By anonymity, this proﬁle has the same value that: (R0,R 2,R 3).
By expression (10) both values are considered indiﬀerent with preferences R0.
Hence, by strong reciprocity in the two directions with respect to agent 1,
the following holds true: f(R1,R 2,R 3)I1f(R1,R 2,R 0)( 2 ) .
Now, let us remember that, by the manipulability assumption at the
original proﬁle, it is true that: f(R0,R 2,R 3)P1f(R1,R 2,R 3)( 3 ) .N o t i c et h a t








But notice that single- peaked preferences only allow for at most two
distinct indiﬀerence points, so only two possibilities can occur:
1- f(R0,R 2,R 3)=f(R1,R 0,R 3), -or f(R0,R 2,R 3)P1f(R1,R 2,R 0)- in which
case, using the analogous to expression (2) corresponding to the change
from R1 to R2 in the proﬁle (R1,R 0,R 3), the ﬁnal preference proﬁle being:
(R2,R 0,R 3):f(R1,R 2,R 3)I1f(R1,R 0,R 3)( 4 ) , and the following expression
will hold:
f(R1,R 2,R 3)I1f(R1,R 0,R 3)=f(R0,R 2,R 3). This contradicts directly
the manipulability hypothesis -expression (1)-.
2-e i t h e rf(R1,R 0,R 3) <f(R0,R 2,R 3) <f(R1,R 2,R 3)o r
f(R1,R 2,R 3) <f(R0,R 2,R 3) <f(R1,R 0,R 3)a n da l w a y s :f(R1,R 2,R 0)=
f(R1,R 0,R 3). Because if f(R0,R 2,R 3)=f(R1,R 2,R 3), there is a contradic-
tion with the manipulability of the original proﬁle, and it is the only possi-
bility for (4) to hold true due to the single-peakedness of preferences. Notice
that in this case we can consider proﬁle: (R1,R 0,R 3) and suppose that agent
1 changes his preferences from R1 to R2, reaching the proﬁle of preferences
16(R2,R 0,R 3). Let us examine the eﬀect of the change on agent 2 -with pref-
erences R0-. As expression (1) holds and, by anonymity, f(R2,R 0,R 3)=
f(R0,R 2,R 3)-p e r m u t i n ga g e n t s ’1a n d2p r e f e r e n c e s- ,b yr e c i p r o c i t yw i t h
respect to 2 the following relation should be true:
f(R1,R 0,R 3)I1f(R2,R 1,R 3)=f(R1,R 2,R 3)-b ya n o n y m i t y- .
Consider now the proﬁle (R1,R 2,R 3) and suppose that agent 3 with pref-
erences R3 moves to preferences R0.T h e ﬁnal proﬁle will be (R1,R 2,R 0),
and by (2), the eﬀect on agent 1 will be: f(R1,R 2,R 3)I1f(R1,R 2,R 0). Using
strong reciprocity and anonymity we have:
f(R0,R 2,R 3)=f(R0,R 2,R 3)I3 f(R1,R 2,R 3)( 5 ) . But f(R1,R 0,R 3)i s
strictly on the right or strictly on the left of f(R0,R 2,R 3)a n df(R1,R 2,R 3)
and the peak of R3 is such that: p(R3) ∈ [f(R1,R 2,R 3),f (R0,R 2,R 3)], so
single-peakedness will imply:
f(R0,R 2,R 3)P3 f(R1,R 0,R 3)=f(R1,R 2,R 0)( 6 )a n d
f(R1,R 2,R 3)P3 f(R1,R 0,R 3)=f(R1,R 2,R 0)( 7 ) .
We can construct the symmetric change (R2 moves to preferences R0)t o
check the relation:
f(R0,R 2,R 3)P2 f(R1,R 2,R 0)=f(R1,R 0,R 3)( 6 0)a n d
f(R1,R 2,R 3)P2 f(R1,R 2,R 0)=f(R1,R 0,R 3)( 7 0).
L e tu sr e m e m b e rt h a tw ea r ei nt h eo n l yc a s ea l l o w e db yt h es i n g l e -
peakedness assumption in which: f(R1,R 2,R 0)=f(R1,R 0,R 3). As both
proﬁles achieve the same social choice, everybody will feel indiﬀerent be-
tween them, and in particular, agents with preferences I0 : f(R1,R 2,R 0)I0
f(R1,R 0,R 3). This can be written, by anonymity, in this way:
f(R1,R 2,R 0)I0 f(R1,R 3,R 0). L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h eﬁrst proﬁle in the rela-
tion and suppose that agent 2 changes his preferences from R2 to R3, obtain-
ing f(R1,R 3,R 0). By strong reciprocity with respect to agent 3, the following
will be true:
f(R1,R 2,R 3)I2 f(R1,R 0,R 3)=f(R1,R 3,R 0). But recalling expression
(60) and relation (5) for the symmetric case when agent 2 changes from pref-
erences R2 to R0 : f(R0,R 2,R 3)I2 f(R1,R 2,R 3) (6) above. From (60)a n d
(70), it should be true that:
f(R1,R 0,R 3)I2 f(R1,R 2,R 3). But we have seen that the following is true:
f(R1,R 2,R 3)P2 f(R1,R 0,R 3), a n dt h i si st h ec o n t r a d i c t i o nw ew e r el o o k -
ing for.
We have proved till now that under our assumptions, every strong recip-
rocate and anonymous SCF has to be strategy-proof. Using now Moulin’s [6]
characterization of anonymous, strategy-proof voting schemes and the results
related for SCFs in the right direction, we obtain that such SCFs. should
belong to the class of voting schemes deﬁned by Moulin as Generalized Con-
dorcet winner solutions (n+1). Now,itsuﬃces to prove that the only voting
17schemes belonging to the class of GCWS(n + 1) that are strong reciprocate
are those that allocate all the phantom voters to the same point, i.e.,
{Π : <
n → A | Π(R)=m(p(R1),p(R2),...,p(Rn),a,a,...,a n+1)}
Suppose that we face a voting scheme from the GCWS(n + 1) family such
that there exist at least two phantom voters allocated in diﬀerent points
in the interval: ∃αh,αl with αh 6= αl, αh < αl. Take, then any piece of
the interval [αh,αl] with no phantom voters in it and ﬁxa n yp r o ﬁle with
all the people’s peaks inside that interval. It is not diﬃcult to check that
the social choice will coincide some of the agents’ peaks, say individual i
(p(Ri)=m(x,α)). Consider that the agent which peak is closer to that of i
-let’s call him j- changes his preferences to any other with peak in the open
interval between the initial peaks of i and j. It is straightforward that the
median cannot change, so everybody feels indiﬀe r e n tw i t hb o t hp r o ﬁles. By
strong reciprocity, if agent i would change to j0s new peak and j would be
the initial 1, i should be indiﬀe r e n tw i t hb o t hp r o ﬁles. But this is impossible,
since the new social choices change and cannot jump over anybody’s peaks,
so j would strictly gain and the voting scheme is not strong reciprocate.
The only voting schemes allowed are, then those with all the n+1 phan-
tom voters located at the same point; but this is another expression for the
constant function.
Step 2.( ⇐) Any constant SCF is strong reciprocate. This part is obvious
and follows directly from the deﬁnition of strong reciprocity.
This result turns out to be even worse than expected, since constant
SCFs are far more undesirable that Thomson’s family Φ, which are at least
eﬃcient, so we can fear about the possibilities of introspective solidarity
against WDUPR. Notice, however, that the apparently narrow behavior
of strong reciprocity is extremely sensitive to the unnecessary and strong
requirement that we have already seen behind the deﬁnition related to the
responsiveness of strong reciprocity when facing indiﬀerence situations. In
this line, we hope that weak reciprocity will yield better results than its
stronger version. The problem is that the last proof cannot be applied to
t h ew e a kr e c i p r o c i t yc a s eb e c a u s ew eh a v eu s e dt h ei n d i ﬀerence features that
are not shared by weak reciprocity. The analysis can however be simpliﬁed
when we impose the additional property of eﬃciency. In exchange, we can
forget about the minimal 3-agents size of society of the former result.
Theorem 3 Let < = <SP. The only weak reciprocate, anonymous and eﬃ-
cient SCFs are those belonging to the class GCWS(n − 1).
18Proof. As this is a characterization theorem, we must prove both direc-
tions:
⇒) First, we will prove that if f is a weak reciprocate, anonymous and
eﬃcient SCF, it has to be strategy-proof. We proceed by contradiction.
Suppose that f is not strategy-proof, but it is weak reciprocate, anonymous
and eﬃcient and we will ﬁnd a contradiction.
If f is not strategy-proof, we know that there exist: ∃l ∈ N, ∃R ∈
<n, ∃R0 ∈ <, such that f(R0,R−l)Plf(R). Since we suppose f to be anony-
mous, we can rename the individuals and the new SCF will be invariant,
so consider the following permutation of agents such that all are reordered
according to the following rule: ∀j,h ∈ N,
if f(R0,R−i) <f(R), σ(j) < σ(h) ⇔ f(R0,R−i)−p(Rj) >f(R0,R−i)−
p(Rh).
if f(R0,R−i) >f(R), σ(j) > σ(h) ⇔ f(R0,R−i)−p(Rj) <f(R0,R−i)−
p(Rh).
We can always construct the above permutation, which simply consists
in ordering the individuals in direct relation with the distance from his peak
to the extreme deﬁned by the direction of the shift in the value of f due
to the considered manipulation. Hence, call i = σ(l) -the new name of the
agent manipulating the rule-, and suppose without loss of generality that
f(R0,R−i) <f (R) -all the argument can be easily replicated to the other
case-. Now, by eﬃciency, somebody in the manipulable proﬁle R should
loose with the shift, and moreover, ∃h>isuch that p(Rh) ≥ f(R), since
if not, f(R)w o u l dn o tb ea ne ﬃcient alternative for R -everybody’s peaks
would be strictly on the left of f(R)-, so take the agent with the highest
peak in proﬁle R - i ft h e r ea r em o r et h a no n e ,t a k ea n yo ft h e m -a n dl e t
us call him j, so it holds that p(Rj)=m a x
h∈N
p(Rh). It holds for this indi-
vidual that f(R)Pjf(R0,R−i)( 1 ) . Since f is weak reciprocate and anony-
mous, applying Lemma 1 to (1),-while inverting roles of Ri and R0-w ek n o w
that the following statements are true: f(R0,R−i)I0f(R0,R i,R−i−j) (2) and
f(R)Pif(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)( 3 ) . By linking the manipulability hypothesis with
(3), we get: f(R0,R−i)Pif(R)Pif(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)( 3 0), so the former three
proﬁles yield diﬀerent outcomes and, by the single-peakedness assumption,
only two possibilities can occur:
(i).f (Ri,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R−j) <f(R0,R−i) <f(R).
Notice that in this case, it must be by (2) and (30)t h a t
p(R0) ∈ (f(R0,R−j),f (R0,R−i)),p (Ri) ∈ (f(R0,R−j),f (R))and
p(Rj) ≥ f(R). By eﬃciency of f(R0,R−j), there exists some other indi-
vidual h with preferences in R such that p(Rh) ≤ f(R0,R−j), so by single-
peakedness, f(R0,R−j)Phf(R0,R−i)( 1 0). Now, consider the change of indi-
19vidual i from preferences Ri in proﬁle (Ri,R 0,R−i−j)=( R0,R−j)t op r e f e r -
ences Rj, such that the ﬁnal proﬁle will be (Rj,R 0,R−i−j). By anonymity,
f(Rj,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R−i), and individual i gains with the change by (30),
the ﬁrst proﬁle being manipulable by i. Let us check the eﬀe c to ft h es h i f to n
individual h :b y( 1 0), agent h strictly loses and, by reciprocity with respect to
h, it holds that f(Ri,R 0,R j,R−i−j−h)=f(R0,R−h)Ijf(R0,R−i), (20), and
f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R−j)Pif(R0,R−h). Since f(R0,R−h) 6= f(R0,R−i)
by the assumption of manipulability and single-peakedness, it is true that
f(R0,R−h) >f(R0,R−i), and by (20) and the above restrictions on the peaks,
we know that p(Rj) ∈ (f(R0,R−i),f (R0,R−h)) and hence,
p(Ri),p(Rj),p(R0) <f (R0,R−h). But, notice that by construction,
p(Rj)=m a x
g∈N







, so f(R0,R−h)c a n n o tb ea n
eﬃcient alternative in proﬁle (R0,R−h), a contradiction.
(ii).f (R0,R−i) <f (R) <f (Ri,R 0,R−i−j)=f(R0,R−j), so if both
extreme proﬁles are considered indiﬀerent by preferences R0 by expression
(2), since single-peaked indiﬀe r e n ts e t sh a v ea tm o s tt w op o i n t s ,i tm u s t
be that f(R)P0f(R0,R−j)( 4 )a n df(R)P0f(R0,R−i)( 4 0). Now, let us con-
sider the proﬁle (Ri,R 0,R−i−j); Notice that (4) and (3) respectively imply:
p(R0) <f (R0,R−j)a n dp(Ri) <f (R0,R−j), so by eﬃciency of f(R0,R−j),
∃j0 ∈ N, j0 6= j, such that p(Rj0) ≥ f(R0,R−j). Now, let us consider that
individual j with preferences R0 in proﬁle (Ri,R 0,R−i−j) changes to prefer-
ences Rj -his initial ones-, reaching the proﬁle R. By expression (4),jwith
preferences R0 strictly gains by declaring Rj, so we have found another ma-
nipulable proﬁle. Moreover, agent j0 strictly looses with the change, so we
also know that: f(Ri,R 0,R−i−j)Pj0f(R). Now, we are in the conditions of
applying Lemma 12 and repeating all the former steps again, where only the
case (ii) is to be considered, but now the role of preferences Ri is performed
by R0, the role of R0 is carried out by Rj and the one of Rj is for Rj0,s ow e
can always construct a sequence of proﬁles of the form:
R(1) =( R1,R 0,R 3,R 4,R 5,...,Rn)
R(2) =( R1,R 2,R 0,R 4,R 5,...,Rn)
R(3) =( R1,R 2,R 3,R 0,R 5,...,Rn)
R(4) =( R1,R 2,R 3,R 4,R 0,...,Rn)
........................................
R(n−1) =( R1,R 2,R 3,R 4,R 5,...,R0)
in which some agent can manipulate the rule by changing preferences to
another initially present in proﬁle R a n ds u c ht h a t :
20f(R(1)) <f(R(2)) <f(R(3)) <f(R(4)) <. . .<f(R(n−1))a n d
∀h ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, ∀l ∈ {1,...,h},f (R(h)) >p (R0) ≥ max
l
p(Rl).
Therefore, proﬁle R(n−1) cannot be eﬃc i e n t ,s i n c et h e r ea r en om o r ei n -
dividuals with preferences in R with peaks on the right of f(R(n−1))a n d
every peak is strictly on the left of f(R(n−1)). This is a contradiction and f
has to be strategy-proof. Now, we can apply Barber` a & Jackson [3] result:
the only strategy-proof SCFs must be voting schemes, and Moulin’s [6] re-
sult, which states that every anonymous, eﬃcient and strategy-proof voting
scheme should belong to the family of GCWS(n − 1).
⇐) The implication: Π ∈ GCWS(n−1) ⇒ Π is anonymous and eﬃcient
is easy and is already proved in Moulin [6]. So, it is suﬃcient to prove that
every voting scheme in Moulin’s class is weak reciprocate, and the character-
ization will be complete.
Let us take any voting scheme Π ∈ GCWS(n − 1); That is, we ﬁxa n
arbitrary distribution of phantom voters α =( α1,α2,...,αn−1). We will
prove that the median of the peaks and phantoms gives us a voting scheme
that preserves the weak reciprocity property. The median is deﬁned as
follows: m(p(R1),p(R2),...,p(Rn),α1,...,αn−1) ⇔ #{i | p(Ri) ≤ m} +
#{i | αi ≤ m} ≥ n and
#{i | p(Ri) ≥ m} +#{i | αi ≥ m} ≥ n.
Suppose any ﬁxed distribution of peaks p(R)=( p(R1),p(R2),...,p(Rn)),
so that the social decision is m = m(p(R),α) and that somebody -let us call
him i- changes his peak -without loss of generality one whose peak is on the
left of the median (p(Ri) ≤ m)- to p(R0) 6= p(Ri). T h es h i f to ft h en e w
choice will depend on the allocation of agent i0s new peak. There are two
possibilities:
1- p(R0) ≤ m(p(R),α):
We need to know how this change will aﬀect the remaining agents, in
order to check the reciprocity of the voting scheme. Notice that in this case
the cardinality of the set of agents at both sides of the initial median will not
vary and the distribution of phantoms is always the same. By the deﬁnition
of median, the new choice will be the same:
m(p(R
0,R−i),α)=m
0 = m = m(p(R),α).
Every individual will be then indiﬀerent with both distributions of peaks
and, by weak reciprocity we should check that every agent with peak p(R0)
should either not aﬀect i or improve i0s position. Let us consider any j
such that p(Rj) ≤ m. If j changes to p(R0), the total number of peaks on
21the left of the median will remain unchanged, so the median cannot vary:
m(p(R0,R−j),α)=m00 = m = m(p(R),α), so i does not loose. Now, let
us ﬁx any individual h with initial peak on the right of m : If he changes
his preferences to x0
i, t h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h em e d i a ni n c r e a s e si t sw e i g h t
relative to the right side -which lose j0s vote- so, in the case of shifting
the choice, it has to be to the left of the initial median, so it is true that:
m(p(R0,R−j),α)=m00 ≤ m = m(p(R),α). But the change of just one
individual cannot make the median jump over anybody’s peak, so everybody
with peaks strictly on the left of the initial median -including agent i-s h o u l d
gain with the change. The only remaining possibility is that of p(Ri)=m,
but in this case, whenever p(R0) ≤ m, if the initial change changes the rule’s
choice, we are in case 2, and if it does not, nobody can individually make
the decision shift to the left, so reciprocity holds in this case.
2- p(R0) ≥ m :
In this case, it is easy to prove that m0 ≥ m and every p(Rj) >m
implies p(Rj) ≥ m0. By single-peakedness, ∀j ∈ N such that p(Rj) ≥
m, m0Rjm, and weak reciprocity: m(p(R0,R−j),α)Rim should hold. Notice
that m(p(R0,R−j),α) ≤ m(p(R0,R−i),α), and by single-peakedness again it
will always be true that
m(p(R0,R−j),α)Rim. Let us see what happens with people on the left
of the initial mean: For p(Rj) ≤ m, everybody will be equal or worse oﬀ
than before: mRjm(p(R0,R−i),α); so, by weak reciprocity we will expect i to
weakly lose if some j such that p(Rj) ≤ m moves to p(R0). As p(R0) ≥ m, the
following medians will coincide: m(p(R0,R−j),α)=m(p(R0,R−i),α), and by
single-peakedness -or simply looking at the deﬁnition of median above- i will
not improve his position and this holds: mRim(p(R0,R−j),α).
The last result establishes the characterization of the large set of SCFs
which are anonymous, eﬃcient and weak reciprocate SCFs. As we said above,
introspective solidarity interpreted as weak reciprocity allows for a larger
set of procedures for making public decisions that the eﬀective solidarity
requirement represented by WDUPR. The important role given to the status
quo when requiring the latter property along with eﬃciency disappears when
w er e q u i r ew e a kr e c i p r o c i t y ,s ot h eS C Fc a nb em a d em u c hm o r es e n s i t i v e
and responsive to changes in the individuals’ tastes.
Finally, it may be useful to comment the price we have to pay for this re-
sult with respect to that of strong reciprocity. We have yet argued that weak
reciprocity is a weaker concept of solidarity than strong reciprocity, but it
makes more sense, so that strong reciprocity is undoubtedly too stringent at a
minimal conceptual cost. More interesting is the following question: since the
eﬃciency and anonymity requirements are both needed for the last theorem
22to hold, we may wonder about what kind of weak reciprocate SCFs are we
eliminating by imposing anonymity and eﬃciency together. Since anonymity
is implied by replacement monotonicity combined with eﬃciency, the eﬃ-
ciency property is the crucial assumption in order to compare both solidarity
principles. We should then, expect both weak reciprocate and replacement
monotonic SCFs to exist outside the eﬃciency environment. The problem is
that they may not be voting schemes and strategy-proof, so that the whole
preference relations of the agents may be relevant to determine the outcome.
This fact makes them too complex objects and diﬃcult to implement. We
can only provide the reader with two families of SCFs. of this kind that lay
outside our analysis and they are anonymous, weak reciprocate and replace-
ment monotonic, but they lack eﬃciency -in fact, they hardly select eﬃcient
alternatives and are manipulable-. The ﬁrst class contains no voting scheme:
Assume < = <SP and let us consider the family Ψ = {fa | a ∈ [0,M]}. Given







{x ∈ [0,M] | xIia} iff ∀i ∈ N, #{x ∈ [0,M] | xIia} > 1
M otherwise
This function is not diﬃcult to understand: it simply ﬁnds the largest
p o i n tt h a ti si n d i ﬀerent with the ﬁxed one a -or M if there does not exist
another one -for every individual- and then, selects the largest -the closest
to M-. Notice that this SCF makes broad use of the information outside the
agents’ peaks. Let us deﬁne
bi(R)=
½
max{{x | xIia},a} iff ∃x 6= as . t .x I ia.
M otherwise ∀R ∈ <.
Notice that any function in the class Ψ is replacement monotonic since
any shift in the function cannot jump over anybody’s bi(R)s ot h a te i t h e r
everybody gains or everybody loses. It is not strong reciprocate because
whenever fa(R)=bj, if agent i with bi(R) <b j(R) changes to preferences
such that b0
i(R)=a, since b0
i(R) <b i(R) <b j(R), the social choice does not
change, and leave all the others indiﬀerent, but whenever agent j moves to
a, the social choice shifts and everybody gains, so i will not be indiﬀerent.
Notice that weak reciprocity holds in any case.
The second class are voting schemes, and they are anonymous, weak
reciprocate and replacement monotonic, but they are not eﬃcient, strategy-
proof and strong reciprocate. Consider the class Σ = {fa | a ∈ [0,M]}.




p(R1) iff p(R1)=p(R2)=... = p(Rn).
a otherwise
234 Conclusions
We have investigated in this work the introspective solidarity principles of
reciprocity in public goods environments when monetary compensations are
not possible.
In a ﬁrst step, we try to calibrate the power of the reciprocity property
combined with anonymity in a general context with a ﬁnite set of alternatives,
without imposing any domain restriction on the preference space. Corollary
1 oﬀe r su san e g a t i v er e s u l t .I ti ss h o w nt h a tw ec a n n o tﬁnd any anonymous
and reciprocate SCF within this unrestricted domain. We are, then, com-
pelled to impose some kind of structure on the space of preferences to obtain
a positive result. In order to compare reciprocity with welfare-domination
under preference-replacement, we move to the public good context with in-
ﬁnite alternatives deﬁned into a closed interval on the real line, where the
single-peakedness restriction is quite a natural assumption.
Theorem 3 provides the answer within this new context and proves that
there exist eﬃcient, anonymous and weak reciprocate SCFs. Moreover, all
of them are fully characterized and the class of functions that preserve both
properties turns out to coincide with Moulin’s class of Generalized Condorcet
winner solutions. This result can be considered in two diﬀerent ways. First, it
i sc l e a rt h a tw eh a v ea c h i e v e do u rg o a lo fenlarging the small class of replace-
ment monotonic SCFs by allowing for procedures that are more sensitive to
individual preferences. Secondly and in a strategic context, we can consider
the result as some kind of reinforcement of the class of strategy-proof SCFs
within the restricted domain of single-peakedness, since we show that they
also satisfy some introspective solidarity principle.
Theorems 1 and 2 explore the strong version of reciprocity in the pub-
lic good context and conclude that there do not exist minimally responsive
strong reciprocate and anonymous SCFs. and they are not compatible with
eﬃciency either. The reason why strong reciprocity is so much demanding
than its weak version lies essentially on the treatment of changes in pref-
erences that do not alter the social decision. Strong reciprocity is clearly
overdemanding when it requires that when somebody changes and the so-
cial decision does not move, nobody else can make it shift with the other’s
preferences.
Whatever interpretation of the result we may like best, it may be worth-
while to point out the close relations between strategy-proofness and the
reciprocity-anonymity condition in some restricted domains -not only that
of single-peakedness, but that of strict orderings too-. When talking about
reciprocate SCFs, we are imposing a fairness principle of equal treatment
among individuals when someone suﬀers a preference mutation. The fair-
24ness principle in some of its usual forms may not make sense when people
can lie about their real preferences. But notice that reciprocity is consis-
tent even in this uncertain context of private information, and this concep-
tual consistency is obtained free from the implied strategy-proofness of the
anonymous-reciprocate SCF.
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